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Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have dis-
closed the sterile influence of the doctrine of precedent in the field of
constitutional law. A constitutional amendment apparently must be
adopted to permit the states or the federal government to tax personal
incomes received as salaries or interest payments from other govern-
mental units. And a constitutional amendment must be adopted to per-
mit any state to enact minimum wage legislation. One of these de-
cisions, popularly described as the New York Minimum Wage Case,'
has received comment and criticism from editorial writers all over the
country. The other one, the Municipal Bankruptcies Case,2 has been
accepted with little editorial comment. Both cases are incidentally illus-
trative of the same trends.
There is not much that can be said about the "legal" problems in-
volved in the Minimum Wage Case. The Chief Justice just about cov-
ered the ground, as far as "legal" criticism is concerned, when he
pointed out wherein the statute in the New York case was different
from the statute considered in the earlier leading case-precedent, Ad-
kins v. Children's Hospital,3 and indicated how the court might give
lip service to the doctrine of precedent while distinguishing the second
case from the first.4 Mr. Justice Stone came out for "overruling" the
earlier decision and thereby used a language technic also familiar to
constitutional lawyers likely to be concerned about precedents, although
in principle he was ready to admit that the Court should state its posi-
tion, regardless of precedent, as to the effect of the due process clause
on state minimum wage legislation.5
There are several developments probable in the more or less im-
mediate future. The device of judicial supremacy may be scrapped,
probably through a constitutional amendment. Lawmen generally hope
that such will not be the case.6 As a political device judicial supremacy
has worked well. It serves to protect the community against temporary
majorities. The constitution may be amended specifically to permit state
legislatures to adopt particular kinds of social legislation. 7 The process
of amending is cumbersome. The more particular the amendment is in
I Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, (U.S. 1936) 80 L.ed. 921.
'Ashton v. Cameron County W. I. Dist No. One, (U.S. 1936) 80 L.ed. 910.
'261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.ed. 785 (1923).4 Morehead v. New Yark ex rel. Tipaldo, supra note 1 at 931 et seq. The leg-
islation in this case prescribed a scheme for the working out and enforce-
ment of minimum wage legislation for women in different industrial groups.
It is apparently conceded, as the Chief Justice indicates by inference at least,
that minimum wage legislation for men would be unconstitutional. There are
too many "precedents" against it. See Donovan, The Constitutional Authority
of Several States to Deal Jointly with Social and Labor Problems (1936) 20
MARQ. L. Rav. 78, 80-84. The discussion in the text above is based upon the
premise that there is no reason other than precedent for distinguishing be-
tween men and women in regard to minimum wage legislation.
5 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, supra note 1 at 937 et seq.
6 See Note (1936) 17 CHICAGO BAR REcoRD 170.
7 Candidate Landon made this suggestion to the Republican party after he had
received notice of his nomination and after he had read the party platform.
See (June 20, 1936) 7 NEWS WEEK, No. 25, p. 10.
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form, the more likely it is to be the kind of policy choice which a legis-
lature, a deliberative body, should make.8 To avoid future difficulties
of interpretation and conflict between this one and other existing gen-
eral provisions in the constitution it would be necessary that the amend-
ment be specific in its references to the due process clause in the Four-
teenth Amendment.9 Finally, and it maybe noted that this suggested
development is less probable than either of the others, lawyers may be
ready to accept the proposition that the theory of precedent has no
place in the field of constitutional law. This thesis has been set out else-
where in an article in this Review.10 It is enough now to suggest that
the due process clauses, the bill of rights, and the device of judicial
supremacy are sufficient to give courts the power to protect individuals
against the enforcement of ill-considered and socially or morally dan-
gerous legislation.
Lawyers do not like to admit, nor does the Court itself like to do so,
that the Court frequently must exercise a political function when it
makes certain policy choices."' Whenever the Court finds it necessary to
determine whether an act of Congress is within the scope of the com-
merce clause, or whether particular state legislation affects interstate
commerce adversely, the Court is effecting a balance between state and
federal agencies in carrying 'on the functions of government. There is
and there ought to be no guide in these cases, or in the due process
cases, other than what the justices as intelligent and disinterested um-
pires feel is good for the community, what they are satisfied will
be necessary to permit governmental agencies to function effectively,
what they feel is sufficient to insure protection to the personal integrity
of the individuals in the community. It is absurd to propose that when
the Court makes an adjustment in one generation it has acted to fix
irrevocably, unless there is a subsequent amendment, a political balance
which must continue in spite of changes in the industrial and social life
of the country.' 2 It makes little difference whether the Court's opinions
8 As illustrative of the type of amendment which is comprehensive and intended
to cover and to authorize specific future policy choices by Congress and in-
tended to permit thereby the readjustment of the political balance between
the states and the federal government in carrying on the functions of gov-
ernment, see the amendment proposed by Professor Bunn in Production,
Prices, Incones, and the Constitution (1936) 11 Wis. L. REv. 313, 322. It
would seem, however, that even this proposed amendment, as worded, would
not permit Congress, or the state legislatures, to hurdle the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
9 Certainly the interstate compact provides no outlet from the "no-man's land"
of the due process clauses. Cf. Donovan, supra note 4.
'oRestatement of the Law of Agency (1936) 20 MARQ. L. REv. 141, 143, n. 7.
See Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 COL. L. R v. 1.
"See Roberts, J., in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U.S. 330,
346, 55 Sup. Ct. 758, 79 L.ed. 1468 (1936) and in United States v. Butler, 56
Sup. Ct. 312, 318, 80 L.ed. 287, 293 (1936). See also Sutherland, J., in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., (U.S. 1936) 80 L.ed. 749, 761. But on the other side, see
Stone, J., dissenting in United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 324, 328, 80
L.ed. 287, 301 (1936) and in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, (U.S.
1936) 80 L.ed. 921, 937, 938. See also Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes
(1935) 49 HARV. L. REv. 1, 193; Haines, Judicial Review of Acts of Congress
and the Need for Constitutional Reform (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 816.
12 In the NRA case, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L.ed. 1570 (1935), the Court was required to do more
than to effect a division of functions between the states on the one hand
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are filled with citations and references. The particular decision repre-
sents a political choice and depends on the will of the judges, guided in'
every case by what their ideas of morals and good sense tell them they'
should do. There are few literal prescriptions in the federal constitu-
tion. 13 The device of judicial supremacy is abused if the Court permits
itself to fix its policy choices permanently into the constitutional
scheme.
In the Municipal Bankruptcies Case14 the immediate problem with
which the legislature, Congress, sought to cope does not now in retro-
spect seem to have been particularly acute. There is perhaps little
danger of the appointment of receivers in case municipalities or other
administrative subdivisions of the states fail to pay their maturing ob-
ligations. 5 The working out of political schemes to solve the problems
attendant on the piling up of tax delinquencies and municipal insolven-
cies are problems for political scientists. These schemes should be criti-
cized from the point of view of administrative practicability and with
respect for the interests of those persons resident in the communities
affected by the carrying out of the proposed schemes. Whether the
several plans proposed as necessary to solve the existing problems can
be worked out more effectively through state or through federal
agencies must also be considered. Discharge from indebtedness after
compromise with creditors, even in the case of municipalities, can be
worked out only through a combination of bankruptcy administration
and consent by the units affected. That is what Congress sought to
bring about through Sections 78, 79 and 80 of the Bankruptcy Act.16
That is what the Court refused literally to consider on its merits. Mr.
Justice McReynolds, speaking for the Court, fell back upon M'Culloch
v. Maryland' and Collector v. Day.' This power assumed by Congress
under the bankruptcy clause, he suggests, is comparable to the power
to tax; Congress may destroy the state governments if it can tax the
agencies of the state, or if it can provide for the supervision through
federal agencies of adjustments between state units and their creditors.
There is little hope that our states and the federal government may
escape the bogey of tax exempt incomes without amendment when
and the federal government on the other. There was an important procedural
problem, also political, covered by the "delegation of authority" language.
The regulatory devices used to carry out the administrative features of the
NIRA, but vaguely outlined in the language of the statute, were in the minds
of every member of the Court unsafe political schemes. Tested from the
angle of political policy the choice of the unanimous bench was probably
wise. See Vold, The NRA and the AAA Experimnents in Government, Eco-
nomics, and Law (1936) 14 NEB. L. BULL. 417.
13 See, for example, U. S. CONST. ART. I, §§ 2, 3, ART II, § 1.
14 Ashton v. Cameron County W. I. Dist. No. One, (U.S. 1936) 80 L.ed. 910.
'5 Cf. Meriwether v. Garret, 102 U.S. 472, 26 L.ed. 197 (1880); Fordham,
Methods of Enforcing Obligations of Public Corporations (1933) 33 COL. L.
Rxv. 28, 53.
1648 STAT. 798 (1934), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 302, 303 (1935).
1 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.ed. 579 (1819).
1 11 Wall. 113, 20 L.ed. 122 (1871).
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M'Culloch v. Maryland and Collector v. Day are such potent forces
with the present Court.:9
There has been some suggestion that the constitution need not be
amended to permit legislatures, states and federal, to function more
effectively. But Professor Corwin in his "Twilight of the Supreme
Court" missed his guess. The cause, however, is not lost. The President
has alluded recently to the probability that in spite of precedents the
agencies of government, federal and state, may be permitted to func-
tion in expanding fields.2 0 The general declaratory and restrictive pro-
visions of the constitution do not necessarily preclude it. Hope for the
future lies in a bench made up of men who are not only impartial, not
only honest, but men who are also statesmen.
VERNON X. MILLER
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE.-The
Wisconsin Legislature in 1931 enacted the following legislative act:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative, to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence
was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recov-
ery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished by the jury
in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the per-
son recovering."
1l
This Act is now commonly known as the Comparative Negligence
Law. However, previous to 1931 there were in Wisconsin two com-
parative negligence acts. It is true that they were strictly limited, but
the principle of comparative negligence was applicable in both. Section
192.50 (3) of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935) still reads as follows: "In
all actions hereafter brought against such railroad company, under or
by virtue of any of the provisions of this section to recover damages for
personal injuries to any employee, or where such injuries have resulted
in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence shall not bar recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence at-
tributable to such employee."Section 192.29 (6) of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935) reads as fol-
lows: "ACTION FOR DAMAGES, ORDINARY CARE. In any action brought
by any person or his legal representatives against a corporation operat-
ing a railroad in this State, to recover for personal injuries or death,
if it appear that the injury or death in question was caused by the
negligent omission of such corporation to comply with the requirements
of this section, the fact that the person injured or killed was guilty of a
19 It is not the particular choice of policy which the Court made in the Ashton
case that is meant to be criticise*d. It must be conceded that the earlier cases
are enlightening and ought to be considered. It is the approach to the prob-
lem that is criticized herein, the idea that decisions in earlier cases preclude
an examination of an existing controversy on its merits.
20 Roosevelt, "Every Member of the Legal Profession" (1936) 2 VITAL SPEECHES
579. This is the address the President delivered at the Arkansas Centennial
Celebration at Little Rock, June 10, 1936.
'Wis. Laws (1931) c. 242; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 331.045.
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